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Abstract 
This study aims at getting insight in the strategies employed by secondary students 
when they are faced with some famous probabilistic paradoxes. Four different age 
groups of students participated the study (48 in Grade 8, 63 in Grade 9, 53 in Grade 
10 and 49 in Grade 12). All students were given the Bertrand’s Box Paradox and 
the Gardner’s Two Children Paradox modified in an understandable way for all age 
groups. The 213 written responses (answers and explanations) were analysed and 
categorized according to various heuristics, misconceptions and types of strategy 
that seemed to guide students’ choices. Differences among the various grade levels 
and also differences between the two problems in students’ responses of the same 
grade level were explored and discussed. 
Keywords: secondary education, stochastics learning, paradoxes, students’ 
strategies. 
Resumen 
Este estudio tiene como objetivo conocer las estrategias empleadas por los 
estudiantes de secundaria cuando se enfrentan a algunas paradojas probabilísticas 
famosas. Participaron en el estudio cuatro grupos de estudiantes de diferentes 
edades (48-Grado 8, 63-Grado 9, 53-Grado 10, 49-Grado 12). Todos los 
estudiantes resolvieron la paradoja de Bertrand y la paradoja de los dos niños de 
Gardner, modificadas de manera comprensible para todos los grupos de edad. Las 
213 respuestas escritas (respuestas y explicaciones) se analizaron y categorizaron, 
de acuerdo con diversas heurísticas, conceptos erróneos y tipos de estrategia que 
parecían guiar las elecciones de los estudiantes. Las diferencias entre los distintos 
niveles de grado y también las diferencias entre los dos problemas en las respuestas 
de los estudiantes del mismo nivel de grado fueron exploradas y discutidas 
Keywords: educación secundaria, aprendizaje estocástico, paradojas, estrategias de 
los alumnus. 
1. Introduction 
Probabilistic reasoning constitutes a high demanding mental process in which intuition 
plays a central role (Batanero, 2016; Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014; Leviatan, 2002). The 
concept of probability was developed at a slow pace through history to reach its current 
foundation with the various applications. The existence of some problematic situations 
in the path of probability theory development challenged the common sense and caused 
cognitive conflict. Additionally, the mathematical solution in such situations has led to 
the development of fundamental concepts in probability theory, i.e. sample space, 
independence, distinction between permutations and combinations, expected value, 
need for simple equiprobable events (Chernoff & Sriraman, 2014). In contrast to the 
principles of a deterministic world, where mathematical tools and mathematical proofs 
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have a power to convince, in such stochastic situations the power and logic of 
mathematics seem not enough to convince a person and influence well established 
intuitive conceptions. Such situations are found in the literature with the term 
paradoxes. 
Paradoxes are imbedded in situations where the mathematical path contradicts our 
intuition and there is a resistance to the construction of a new knowledge related to 
chance and probabilistic notions (Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014). This resistance is seen 
more frequent while manipulating probabilistic ideas rather than other subject areas or 
disciplines of mathematics. 
In addition, when people need to make judgements or decisions in situations where 
chance is inherent, they employ cognitive mechanisms, which are known in the 
literature as “heuristics”. These mechanisms are sometimes based on misleading 
intuition and established misconceptions, and they constitute an obstacle in thinking 
with probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The case of paradoxes is a 
characteristic example of people relying on heuristics. Due to their complex nature, 
paradoxes have been a point of focus for many researchers. At times, paradoxes have 
been used as research tools for the exploration of types of people’s reasoning or 
strategies they follow to find a solution (Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Taylor & Stacey, 
2014; Falk & Konold, 1992). Other times, such problems have been used as didactical 
tools in undergraduate studies or professional development programs (Batanero, 
Contreras, Fernándes & Ojeda, 2010; Klymchuk & Kachapova, 2012; Gauvrit & 
Morsanyi, 2014). Paradoxes, due to the lack of empirical control, constitute a great 
challenge for students in all levels, but they also may constitute a fruitful terrain for 
stochastic reasoning to develop (Falk & Konold, 1992; Movshovitz-Hadar & Hadass, 
1990). However, despite the didactic potentiality of paradoxes, very little is still known 
for their role in secondary mathematics education. 
This study aims at giving an insight on the way secondary mathematics students of 
different school Grades deal with some popular paradoxes. Particularly, we studied 
students in Grades 8, 9, 10 & 12 and we were guided by the following research 
questions: 
1) What strategies emerged while secondary students were confronted with 
probabilistic paradoxes? 
2) Are there differences in students’ strategies among the various students’ Grades? 
2. Theoretical considerations 
A paradox characterizes “a situation which reflects a contradiction to the current base of 
knowledge” and a puzzle is “a situation in which the current concept yields a solution 
that seems intuitively unacceptable” (Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014, p.35). Paradoxes and 
puzzles are often the motivating power for the development of new conjectures and new 
theories and they contribute to the construction of new knowledge in many scientific 
areas. The role of paradoxes and puzzles is essential, particularly for the development of 
probability theory, since contradictions and counterintuitive examples are in abundance 
in situations where uncertainty and chance dominate (Batanero & Borovcnik, 2016; 
Chernoff & Sriraman, 2014). 
In this paper we focus on two famous paradoxes. The one is known as the Bertrand’s 
Box Paradox (Bertrand, 1889) and the second as the two children problem (Gardner, 
1959) (see Table 1 below). 
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According to Borovcnik & Kapadia (2014), Bertrand’s box paradox stems from viewing 
boxes as equiprobable cases and a resistance to consider the changes in probabilities 
when new information comes to play. Other researchers (e.g. Gauvrit & Morsanyi, 
2014) have also related this problem with the ability to construct correctly the sample 
space of the underlying situation, namely focusing on the 6 simple cases of coins and 
not on the 3 boxes. It is worth mentioning that Poincaré in his book Calcul des 
probabilités refers to this problem in the very first chapter for the definition of 
probability (Poincaré, 1912, p.26). The impact of the given information on the 
calculation of probabilities as well as the ambiguity of the wording result on various 
assumptions which opened a lively debate for the problem’s setup and further 
modifications of it (e.g. Nickerson, 2004; Borovcnik & Kapadia, 2014). The two 
children problem, similarly to the Bertrand’s box paradox, revealed the misleading 
guidance of intuition and the solution is also based on a careful construction of sample 
space which can be facilitated by a two-way table (Taylor & Stacey, 2014). 
Table 1. The two famous paradoxes used in this study 
Bertrand’s box paradox Two children problem 
Consider 3 boxes. The 1st box contains 2 gold 
coins, the 2nd box contains 2 silver coins and the 
3rd box contains one gold and one silver coin. You 
choose one box randomly and then the coins in that 
box are chosen one at a time. Suppose that the first 
coin is gold. What is the probability that the second 
coin is also gold? 
Mr. Jones has two children. The older child is 
a girl. What is the probability that both 
children are girls? 
Mr. Smith has two children. At least one of 
them is a boy. What is the probability that 
both children are boys? 
Although problems like the two discussed above have a mathematical solution, people 
often rely on their intuitions rather than on their mathematical knowledge to deal with 
them. The intuitive perceptions and simple cognitive mechanisms employed when 
judging under uncertainty have been of great interest among researchers in psychology 
and mathematics education community and many of the paradoxes have been used as 
research tools for the exploration of misleading intuitions in stochastic situations.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) highlighted some dominant heuristics, namely principles 
that reduce the complexities of uncertain tasks to simpler operations for making 
decisions. One of these heuristics is the availability heuristic, when people overestimate 
the probability of an event by the ease this event can be recalled in memory. For 
example, one may assess the risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling 
such occurrences among one’s acquaintances (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p.1127). In 
a further study Fischbein & Schnarch (1997) also observed the appearance of this 
heuristic. Particularly in a research involving five age groups (from Grade 5 to college 
level) they found that, as subjects are getting older, their skills and knowledge regarding 
the complementarity and subsequent equality of the two groups increases, and their 
strategies rely on the ease of the underlying combinations. The second heuristic 
identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is the representativeness heuristic, when 
people’s assumptions are based on a representative case or pattern that is expected to 
appear. This heuristic has been also related to various misconceptions such as the 
gamblers’ fallacy (e.g. Falk & Konold, 1992), namely the anticipation that a sequence 
of same outcomes would be reversed next, or the positive recency effect (e.g. Fischbein 
& Schnarch, 1997), namely an assumption that the conditions are not fair given a long 
sequence of same outcomes. The third heuristic identified by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974) is anchoring and adjustment according to which people rely on the first available 
information to make a judgement and then they make necessary adjustments when 
4  Students’ attitudes towards two famous examples of paradoxes. Explanations and strategies in 
various school grades. 
 
 
needed. For example, when a group of high school students estimated the product 8 x 7 
x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 (= 40320) within 5 seconds, the median estimate was 2250, but 
when another group of students estimated the same product written as 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 
6 x 7 x 8, the median estimate was 512. Estimation was based on the first few steps of 
multiplication (Tversky & Kahneman,1974). 
In addition to heuristics, misconceptions and attitudes that rely on false intuitions when 
people addressing probabilistic problems have been also a point of attention for 
researchers. One of the widely discussed such misconceptions is equiprobability bias 
which appears when people assign equal probability to all possible outcomes (e.g. Batanero, 
Serrano & Garfield, 1996). This misconception about randomness seems to increase with 
probability teaching especially when the emphasis is on the classical definition of 
probability (e.g. Gauvrit & Morsanyi, 2014). Another misconception named sample 
space miscount refers to students’ construction of the sample set (set of all possible but 
not equiprobable events) as described by Chernoff and Zazkis (2011) rather than the 
sample space without recognizing that it cannot be used to estimate probabilities. A 
further approach to probabilistic problems is what Konold (1989) named outcome 
approach. This approach refers to strategies which focus only on a successful prediction 
for the outcome of the next trial of a random experiment rather than the probability of it. 
Lastly, personal interpretation refers to judgments based neither on formal tools nor 
heuristics and misconceptions but on personal opinions or beliefs. Some examples are 
summarized by Savard (2014). 
The various heuristics, misconceptions and informal strategies identified when people 
are confronted with randomness and uncertainty reveal the dominant and persistent role 
of intuition as well as the complexities of the cognitive mechanisms that take place in 
stochastic situations. These complexities have opened a field of inquiry not only with 
respect to the aspects of probabilistic thinking but also to the teaching and learning of 
probability (Batanero & Borovcnik, 2016; Pfannkuch, Budgett, Fewster, Fitch, 
Pattenwise, Wild & Ziedins, 2016). The discussion regarding teaching approaches to 
facilitate students to grasp the complexities and counterintuitive aspects of probabilistic 
notions have brought many times to the fore the use of paradoxes as a didactical tool 
(Falk & Konold, 1992; Movshovitz-Hadar & Hadass, 1990). Some studies reflect on the 
use of paradoxes on teaching university students (e.g. Klymchuk & Kachapova, 2012) 
or prospective teachers (e.g. Batanero, Contreras, Fernándes & Ojeda, 2010), thus 
showing the potentiality of these problems to support the learning of probability. There 
are also studies that suggest the use of such problems for the teaching of probability 
even for the secondary education (Batanero, Contreras, Díaz & Cañadas, 2014; 
Batanero, Godino & Roa, 2004; Taylor & Stacey, 2014). However, despite the 
recognized potentiality of paradoxes to motivate students’ learning in secondary 
education and to provide a fruitful ground for the construction and reconstruction of 
meaning around randomness, we still know very little about their role in the teaching 
practice as well as about students attitudes when dealing with them. 
This study aims at giving insight on secondary students’ attitudes towards the two 
paradoxes shown on Table 1. The misconceptions and heuristics mentioned in the 
literature have been acknowledged and explored while students of different grade levels 
respond to these problems. 




3.1 The context of the study 
According to the Greek official curriculum, in secondary education, students are 
introduced to some fundamental statistical concepts (population and sample, statistical 
graphs, frequency and relative frequency distribution, grouping of observations, mean 
and median value in data sets) in Grade 8 for first time and in Grade 9 with some 
probabilistic ideas (sets, sample space and events, the classical definition of 
probability). After these introductory lessons in Grade 8 for statistics and Grade 9 for 
probability, the next time students learn about probability and statistics content is in 
Grade 12. In this lesson there are two large chapters dedicated to statistics and 
probability. One chapter includes descriptive statistics as well as some elements from 
linear regression and linear correlation. The other chapter includes an extended version 
of the Grade’s 9 content as well as some elements of conditional probabilities and 
combinatorics. In all Grades the approach to the content of both statistics and 
probability is formalist, paying attention mainly on formulas, definitions and proofs. 
Despite the guidelines set by the official curriculum, the teaching of statistics and 
probability is often omitted in Grades 8 and 9, due to time limitations. 
In the study participated 213 students in total. More particularly, 48 students of Grade 8, 
63 of Grade 9, 53 of Grade 10 and 49 of Grade 12. Until the time the study took place, 
the students in Grade 12 were the only participants who had typical knowledge of basic 
probabilistic concepts. The others hadn’t been taught about probability and statistics. 
3.2 The paradoxes used and the data of the study 
For our study, we used a questionnaire that consisted of two tasks based on the 
paradoxes seen on Table 1. The wording we used for the problems was due to the 
students’ background with a main consideration to have a common questionnaire for all 
participants, i.e. to be understood by all no matter in which grade level they are. 
The questionnaire of our study is presented in Table 2 below. The original formulation 
was in Greek. Here we present an English translation of the tasks. Each task was given 
in a separate page. 
Table 2. The tasks that we gave to the students (the same for all grade levels). 
TASK 1 TASK 2 
Answer the following questions and explain in detail: 
A. We meet a man who is known to have two kids. We 
ask him: “Do you have at least one boy?” and he 
responds “Yes”.  
Which of the following you consider to be more likely: 
a. He has two boys 
b. He has a boy and a girl 
c. Both are equally likely to happen 
B. We meet a man who is known to have two kids. We 
ask him: “Is your eldest child a girl?” and he responds 
“Yes”. 
Which of the following you consider to be more likely: 
a. He has two girls 
b. He has a boy and a girl 
c. Both are equally likely to happen 
Answer the following question and 
explain in detail: 
A game is played with three cards. One 
card is black on both sides, another card 
is red on both sides and the third card has 
one black side and one red side. We put 
all cards in a box and we shake the box. 
Without looking we draw one card and 
put it on a table. The side we can see is 
red. What can we say for the other side? 
The hidden side is more likely to be: 
a. Red 
b. Black 
c. Both colours are equally 
likely 
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In Task 1 we consider the two questions as one problem, since one of the parameters we 
explore is whether the students will face the two questions as separate problems or as 
the same. Particularly, our aim was to investigate their ability to see the difference in the 
structure of the sample space in the two different cases. For the second task, our focus 
was on whether the students would define correctly the sample space of the problem.  
The questionnaires were distributed by the teacher of mathematics during the lesson and 
students had approximately 40 minutes to answer. Responsible for the distribution and 
the collection of the questionnaire were the teachers of each classroom. The guidelines 
the teachers in charge were given by the researchers were that they shouldn’t give any 
information or clarification with regard to the content of the questions, and they would 
also guarantee the anonymity of the participants. The data of our study were 213 written 
responses of the participants in the two tasks described in Table 2.  
3.3 The method of the data analysis 
The students’ written responses were first grouped according to their grade level and 
then according to the strategy identified in their justification. For the categorization of 
the emerged strategies we acknowledged heuristics and probabilistic misconceptions 
that are discussed in the theoretical section of this paper. In Table 3 we present the 
categories emerged in students’ responses illustrated by some characteristic examples. 
Table 3. Categories used for the analysis of students’ responses 
Types of students’ strategies Examples of students’ responses (translated from Greek) 
No misconception /  
other strategy 
(mathematical arguments or 
using reasoning beyond 
mathematics discipline, in either 
correct or erroneous way) 
(1st task – Grade 12) 
A) He has 2 children:  





So it is more likely to be a boy and a girl 
Or (1st task – Grade 9) 
A) Once we ask someone and use the word “at least”, which is 
negative [in meaning], it means [we ask] if he has at least one boy. 
Since he answers “yes”, one of the two children [only] is a boy 
otherwise he would have answered “both”. 
Availability 
(students recall similar events or 
relative cases)  
(1st task – Grade 9) 
A) Because I am a boy and I have a sister, so it sounds more 
normal to be a boy-girl. 
B) I know many girls who have only sisters and I also have a 
bigger sister.  
Representativeness 
(estimations based on an 
expected pattern)  
(1st task – Grade 8) 
A) It is more likely to have a boy and a girl because one child is a 
boy for sure, and for the other one is more probable to be of 
different gender than the first one, that is to be a girl 
Equiprobability bias 
(assigning equal probability to 
all possible events) 
(1st task – Grade 10) 
A) From the two children we know that one of them is a boy. It is 
equally likely that the second kid is either a boy or a girl 
Outcome approach 
(focus only on a successful 
prediction for the next trial) 
(1st task – Grade 12) 
B) The question refers to the older of the two children, so we can’t 
know anything about the gender of the second child 
Sample space miscount 
(constructing a sample set rather 
than a sample space) 
(1st task – Grade 12) 
A) 2 kids: (i) boy - boy, (ii) girl - boy, (iii) girl - girl. But he has at 
least one boy, so it is likely to be either case (i) or (ii) 




(judgement based on personal 
opinion or beliefs) 
(1st task – Grade 9) 
A) Due to the fact that he has a boy and a girl, he thinks fast that 
he has a boy and so he answers "yes". 
B) 2 girls are nicer. 
No answer (the student neither answers nor gives any justification) 
4. Results 
In Table 4 we summarize the intensity of students participation. More than 92% of the 
students gave back a justified response (valid cases) while less than 8% responded 
without justification (missing cases). The missing cases may be due to the volunteer 
character of the participation in the study. 
Table 4. Case Processing summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Strategy in the 1st task 198 93.0 15 7.0 213 100.0 
Strategy in the 2nd task 197 92.5 16 7.5 213 100.0 
In Figure 1 we present the frequencies of the strategies appearing on Table 3, as 
emerged from students’ responses in the given tasks.  
 
Figure 1. Strategies emerged in students’ responses in the two tasks 
As we can see, in about half of the students’ responses we identified the equiprobability 
bias in both tasks. In the first task, the next more frequent strategies were: personal 
interpretation (25.8%), outcome approach (11.6%) and availability (6.1%). In the 
second task, strategies appearing in high frequency were: sample space miscount 
(17.3%), no misconception / other strategy (11.7%), personal interpretation (8.1%) and 
outcome approach (7.6%).  
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We believe that the differentiation in the way students addressed the two tasks is due to 
the problem context in each case. The first task, which has been set in terms of everyday 
life, causes more personalized interpretations, as well as more detectable desire to 
determine the gender of the children this particular person we meet has. The second task 
seems more mathematical as it refers to a gambling game and so it emerges more 
attempts to record the sample space (both erroneous and correct) and fewer personalized 
interpretations. Moreover, availability comes up in the first task alone, where one has 
the ability (and the tendency) to recall information about two-children families. 
To determine possible differences among different Grades, we use the contingency table 
of each strategy employed by the students per each grade level (Table 5). 
Table 5. Contingency table for the various strategies per Grade in the two tasks 
Strategies 
used 
Grade 8 Grade 9 Grade 10 Grade 12 Total 




0 3 2 9 0 4 3 7 5 23 
.0% 1.5% 1.0% 4.6% .0% 2.0% 1.5% 3.6% 2.5% 11.7% 
Availability 6 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 12 0 
3.0% .0% .5% .0% 1.0% .0% 1.5% .0% 6.1% .0% 
Representati- 
veness 
3 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 1 
1.5% 0.5% .0% 0.0% .5% 0.0% .0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.5% 
Equiproba-
bility bias 
16 21 31 29 24 28 23 26 94 104 
8.1% 10.7% 15.7% 14.7% 12.1% 14.2% 11.6% 13.2% 47.5% 52.8% 
Outcome 
approach 
4 1 9 10 5 2 5 2 23 15 
2.0% 0.5% 4.5% 5.1% 2.5% 1.0% 2.5% 1.0% 11.6% 7.6% 
Sample space 
miscount 
0 8 2 9 1 3 6 14 9 34 
.0% 4.1% 1.0% 4.6% .5% 1.5% 3.0% 7.1% 4.5% 17.3% 
Personal 
interpretation 
15 8 18 4 9 4 9 0 51 16 
7.6% 4.1% 9.1% 2.0% 4.5% 2.0% 4.5% 0.0% 25.8% 8.1% 
No answer 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 4 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
Total 44 42 63 62 42 44 49 49 198 197 
22.2% 21.3% 31.8% 31.5% 21.2% 22.3% 24.7% 24.9% 100% 100% 
As we can see on Table 5, equiprobability bias dominates upon all Grades. We can 
detect a slight decrease as we move from Grade 9 to Grade 12, from 15.7% to 11.6% for 
the first task and from 14.7% to 13.2% for the second task. Grade 8 uses more personal 
interpretations, i.e. 7.6% and 4.1% respectively, while upper Grades stay at 4.5% and 
less than 2.0% respectively. This is to be expected if one considers that students have 
neither the knowledge nor the maturity to deal with the problems. Grade 9 uses personal 
interpretations in a surprisingly higher extend for the first task than for the second one 
(9.1% and 2.0% respectively). Outcome approach makes a "peak" of 4.5% and 5.1% for 
the two tasks respectively in Grade 9, but it is consistent in the other Grades (between 2-
2.5% and 0.5-1% respectively). Sample space miscount seems to be more frequent 
among Grade 12 students than in the other Grades. Particularly, the frequency in Grade 
12 is 3% and 7.1% respectively, while in the other three Grades is less than 1% and less 
than 4.1% respectively. We interpret that as an effort to use the tools acquired during 
teaching, albeit not always in a successful manner. Therefore, education students 
received seems to influence the chosen strategy. Similarly, the use of personal 
interpretation in the upper Grades seems to be diminishing. Overall, personal 
interpretation is used over three times more frequently for the first task than for the 
second task, which appears to be more mathematical. This finding reinforces the view 
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that problems that differ in their external characteristics (even if they have a similar 
mathematical structure) are associated with different intuitive misconceptions. 
Representativeness has very little (almost zero) representation in the problems used. 
5. Conclusions 
With respect to our research questions, we identified six strategies in students’ 
responses to the Bertrand’s (1989) box paradox and the two children problem. The 
emerged strategies are related to heuristics and misleading conceptions widely discussed 
on the literature (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Falk & 
Konold, 1992; Konold, 1989; Chernoff and Zazkis, 2011), while there is a small 
percentage for the first task (2,5%) and a bigger for the second (11,7%) that could not 
be related to any of those strategies. This result may indicate that the second problem 
was comprehended more mathematically than intuitively. Another notable result was 
the high percentage of the equiprobability bias in both tasks. This finding agrees with 
Gauvrit and Morsanyi’s (2014) findings that equiprobability dominates particularly the 
two children problem also used there. As we saw, there is some persistence with 
maturation regarding this bias, so we may assume that school teaching does not seem to 
have helped to a substantial reduction of this misconception. Furthermore, we identified 
important differences not only among the different grade levels but also between the 
tasks in the responses of the same grade level. This indicates the special role of the 
content of the problem in terms of its wording and the underlying context. Particularly, 
if it is closer to mathematical or everyday life context, seemed to be significant in 
employing a mathematical rather than an intuitive approach respectively. 
Besides the limitations of this study (sampling based on accessibility, voluntary 
character, curriculum limitations), we got a deeper insight on how students address 
paradoxical situations in stochastic contexts and how the employed strategies change 
and develop through maturation and formal education. The persistence in time of some 
misleading conceptions which have been also mentioned by other researchers 
(Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Gauvrit & Morsanyi, 2014) indicates a need for 
alternative approaches in probability teaching, were paradoxes may have a central role 
(e.g. Leviatan, 2002). 
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